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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Merger Guidelines ("Guidelines")
present a detailed blueprint for competition analysis, implementa-
tion errors can lead to enforcement actions against potentially
pro-competitive transactions. In our merger monograph, we re-
viewed antitrust enforcement under the Guidelines and high-
lighted a series of ten Pitfalls. Used proactively, the Pitfalls con-
struct prevents an unfocused and potentially costly approach to
merger review by calling attention early on to the most likely
weaknesses of the process. The construct limits the potential ana-
lytical disparity that may emerge as a result of the breadth and
latitude that typifies the interaction of merger law with naturally
evolving economic theory.
In this paper, we advocate the Pitfalls construct as a comple-
ment to traditional merger analysis and one that is most valuable
when used at the outset of a merger review. To illustrate the ap-
plicability, relevance, and generality of the Pitfalls approach, we
examine three recent enforcement decisions. The first is from
Venezuela, the second is from Brazil, and the third is from the
* Significant portions of this article reflect the authors' own analysis.
Their underlying approach is explained in The Economic Analysis ofMergers and
Pitfalls in MergerAnalysis: The Dirty Dozen, which is fully cited in footnote 13.
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Duke University, 1980. The analyses and conclusions set forth in this paper are
the authors' and do not necessarily represent the opinions of KPMG or the
Federal Trade Commission. The discussion of the three cases relies on publicly
available information and does not reveal any confidential data. The authors
would like to thank Mario De Pillis, Jeffrey Fischer, and Mark Williams for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Email: armandorodriguez@kpmg.com and
mcoate@ftc.gov.
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United States. Despite their relevance, it is important to recog-
nize that Pitfall violations are not always linked to enforcement
mistakes.
We discuss ten Pitfalls:
1. Assuming that High Concentration Causes Competitive
Problems
2. Accepting Simplistic Structural Analyses of Collusion
3. Dismissing Efficiencies as Speculative
4. Focusing on the Responses of Infra-marginal Firms
5. Misapplying the Five Percent Market Definition Price
Test
6. Basing a Unilateral Theory only on Market Share
7. Requiring Evidence on Actual Entry
8. Substituting Complaints or Hot Documents for Analysis
9. Considering Guidelines Issues Sequentially
10. Naively Balancing Efficiencies and Anti-competitive
Effects
The Guidelines represent a structured approach used by the
Antitrust Divisions of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to evaluate the competitive
effects of any horizontal merger.1 The Guidelines also have served
' See Revision to Section 4 of Horizontal Merger Guidelines, [1997] 72 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1806, at 359 (April 10, 1997); Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, [1992] 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559, at S-1 (April 2, 1992); Merger
Guidelines, Issued byJustice Department on June 14, 1984, and Accompanying Policy
Statement; [1984] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at S-3 (June 14,
1984); Merger Guidelines, Issued by Justice Department on June 14, 1982, and Attor-
ney General's Statement and FTCs Policy Statement on Horizontal Mergers, [1982]
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as the model for a number of the regulations and procedures used
by the Latin American antitrust agencies in their enforcement
mission.2 Mergers generally play an important role in a market
economy; they penalize ineffective management and facilitate the
efficient flow of investment capital and the redeployment of pro-
ductive capital.3 By regulating mergers, competition policy can
affect the evolution of a market economy.4
The Guidelines articulate the analytical framework that en-
forcement agencies use to determine if a merger is likely to sub-
stantially decrease competition.' By focusing on the economic in-
terests of the various actors in the marketplace, the Guidelines
predict whether a merger is likely to create, enhance, or facilitate
the exercise of market power and whether any anti-competitive
effect would be offset by efficiencies.' Clearly, the adoption of
Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-1 (une 17, 1982) [collectively,
hereinafter Guidelines].
2 For a compendium of competition policy legislation and regulations, see
TRADE UNIT OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS WORKING GROUP ON COMPETITION POLICY, INVENTORY OF
DOMESTIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO COMPETITION POLICY IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (1998); Paulo Correa, The Role of Merger Guide-
lines in the Enforcement ofAntitrust Laws: The Anheuser-Busch-Antartica Case, J.
LATIN AM. COMPETITION POL'Y (Dec. 1998) <http://www.jlacomp.or>
(criticizing the recent Anheuser-Busch/Antartica decision by the Brazilian
competition agency and noting that the use of conventional merger Guidelines
coner a rigor an transparency that could have prevented such a poor deci-
sion); William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls
on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075 (1998) (discuss-
ing the significance of the development of transition economies' merger pol-
icy).
' See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meclding, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 328-29 (1976).
4 See Peter C. Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the
American Economy: Examining History or Theorizing?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1175
(1989) (arguing that antitrust law may have played a positive role in contribut-
ing to improved market efficiency in certain instances.
' See Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory,
and Merger Guidelines, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 281-312 (1991) (providing analysis of the Guideline's policy
toward merger enforcement).
6 The key issue in agency review of mergers and non-merger investigations
is whether the government intends to challenge the proposed transaction or
behavior. The uncertainty undergoing most agency review often has a chilling
effect on the market and certain practices, and-most transactions proceed only
after they are cleared by the agencies.
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the Guidelines represents a commitment to an economic basis for
antitrust policy. Based on this framework, information for a
Guidelines analysis is gathered through a detailed market study
during which the antitrust enforcers survey a wide range of indus-
try participants, review internal documents of the merging par-
ties, and occasionally undertake statistical market analysis.'
The government's concern for the competitive consequences
of mergers will foster a continued examination of appropriate an-
titrust methodology. Certainly, to the extent that some of these
enforcement initiatives do not improve economic welfare, they
typically are, and will continue to be, discarded. Still, novel ini-
tiatives in antitrust enforcement often derive from advances in
economic theory, evolving social mores, changing economic con-
ditions, and political currents. Not surprisingly, given the rela-
tive paucity of merger reviews by the bench, a number of imple-
mentation or interpretation problems with the Guidelines have
appeared over the years, creating the potential for inappropriate
applications of merger policy
" For an alternative position, see CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., CEI
ANTITRUST REFORM PROJECT, ANTITRUST POLICY AS CORPORATE WELFARE
(uly 1997) (arguing that antitrust laws hobble dynamic market processes and in-
fringe on individuals) and DOMiNICK ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND
MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE (1982) (questioning the effec-
tiveness of antitrust policy in improving consumer welfare).
8 Significant mergers and acquisitions must be reported to the enforcement
agencies prior to their consummation. The Clayton Act requires that major
acquisitions be reported to the enforcement agencies. See The Clayton Act 5
7A, 15 U.S.C. S 18a (1999). Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ment Act of 1976, acquisitions must comply with certain procedural require-
ments as well as the substantive standards of the Clayton Act. See Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976). The Guidelines are also routinely used in response to Advisory Opin-
ions and Business Review Letters. Both agencies have formal procedures under
which firms can obtain a Business Review Letter with respect to "proposed
business conduct" affecting either domestic or foreign commerce. See 28
C.F.R. S 50.6 (1999). A Business Review Letter/Advisory Opinion states the
agencies' present enforcement intention concerning the proposed conduct.
The agency remains completely free to bring whatever action or proceeding it
subsequently comes to believe is required by the public interest. See 28 C.F.R.
5 50.6(9) (1999).
' See Richard M. Steuer, Counseling Without Case Law, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
823 (1995); see also Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The
Changing Nature ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1394-95 (1998)
(criticizing the process whereby the agencies make antitrust law without going
to court and explaining that "[t]he centrality of the agencies, rather than the
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Some of these Pitfalls may be linked to the failure to suffi-
ciently change the Guidelines in response to an improved under-
standing of competition, while others stem from the failure of the
merger analyst to understand the spirit of the economic analysis
implicit in the Guidelines and their revisions." In an international
setting, where antitrust law represents an important, albeit new,
vision furthering the gains of market liberalization and reform
processes, additional analytical and practical hazards may inevita-
bly enter the practice of antitrust.
In this paper, we examine three merger cases using the 'Pit-
falls" framework 2 originally presented by the authors in The Eco-
nomicAnalysis ofMergers.3 The taxonomical approach embodied
by the Pitfalls analysis minimizes the cost and use of resources
devoted to merger analysis by focusing on the most controversial
and problematic areas likely to arise in an investigation. Thus, a
Pitfalls approach may shorten the time and scope of investiga-
tions, minimize the likelihood of enjoining potentially efficiency-
enhancing acquisitions, and reduce the cost of antitrust reviews.
courts, defines the new antitrust regulatory mode that dominates the current
government enforcement of the antitrust laws").
10 For a more direct approach to the same question, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV. 937
(1981) (focusing on an analysis of market power to understand and explain anti-
trust cases).
" Venezuela's agency, for example, conducts its investigations against a
backdrop of price controls, currency instability, social and political unrest, and
difficulties with gathering data. Peru's experience reveals that episodes of high
inflation drown out changes in relative prices and that institutional structures
may not be changing at the same pace as macroeconomic phenomena. See
Dennis Carlton, The Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Mar-
kets, in INFLATION CAUSES AND EFFECTS 139 (Robert Hall, ed., 1982). See
generally Robert M. Feinberg & Mieke Meurs, Privatization and Antitrust in
Eastern Europe: The Importance of Entry, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 797, 808-09
(1994) ([R]apid changes in the structure of prices, forms of ownership, and
sources of demand have made it difficult for... profits to operate as a signal
for entry in the way they do in the established market-based economies ....").
12 It is important to note that the Pitfalls present potential misapplications of
the Guidelines' construct. A correct application of the Guidelines may reach the
same conclusion as an incorrect one, and thus Pitfall violations are not sufficient
conditions for enforcement mistakes.
13 MALCOLM B. COATE & A.E. RODRIGUEZ, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF MERGERS (MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INT'L STUDIES, 1997) [hereinafter
COATE & RODRIGUEZ, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. The Pitfalls analysis was de-
veloped systematically in Malcolm B. Coate & A.E. Rodriguez, Pitfalls in
Merger Analysis: The Dirty Dozen (1998) (unpublished article) (on file with
authors).
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The paper is structured as follows. At the outset, we intro-
duce various application problems with the Guidelines, discussed
in a series of ten points, with the earlier entries focusing on issues
that have been partially addressed by revisions in the Guidelines.
Each point or pitfall is presented with a brief introduction fol-
lowed by a succinct commentary on the analytical problem.14
Next, the Pitfalls are illustrated through a discussion of three
cases dealing with government decisions on mergers. The analysis
of the Venezuelan case, concerning Coke/Pepsi, and the Brazilian
case, concerning Anheuser-Busch/Antarctica, are based on the de-
cisions issued by the internal tribunals of each agency. Con-
versely, in the U.S. case, concerning Staples/Office Depot, the
federal court merger decision is used to illustrate various Pitfalls.
We chose these three cases largely because they are well known
and controversial within both the antitrust community and the
general press. We conclude with a brief summary and some pol-
icy implications.
2. UNDERSTANDING THE PITFALLS
The evaluation of the likely competitive effects of a proposed
merger or acquisition is one of the more complicated tasks facing
antitrust regulators because almost all of the analysis is, by neces-
sity, forward-looking. The Guidelines offer a structured approach
to solve this merger enforcement problem. By gathering infor-
mation on a market and using the construct of a hypothetical
price increase, it is possible to predict the profitability, and hence
the likelihood, of an anti-competitive effect." The final stage bal-
ances efficiencies with the expected anti-competitive effects to
generate the appropriate regulatory response.
Although the Guidelines' technique is relatively straightfor-
ward, misinterpretations are possible and can lead to incorrect
policy decisions. Based on the authors' combined experience, case
law, and learned commentary, we have compiled a list of ten
14 For a more thorough discussion of the Guidelines, see COATE &
RODRIGUEZ, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13.
1" The basic Guidelines' hypothetical studies the profitability of various ac-
tions in response to a small, but significant price increase (usually taken to be five
percent) by the merging parties and, oftentimes, others. This construct is used to
define the product an[ geographic markets and plays a role in entry and com-
petitive analysis. Moreover, given all of the information from a Guidelines'
analysis, it is possible to use the same basic procedure to evaluate the likely prof-
itability of a five percent (or smaller) price increase involving the merging parties.
[Vol. 20:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss4/2
MERGER PITFALLS
common errors in the application of the Guidelines' construct.
These issues are briefly described below. It is important to note
that the identification of a Pitfall will not necessarily highlight an
enforcement mistake. Instead, it is necessary to adjust the merger
analysis and generate a new conclusion.
2.1. Assuming High Herfindahis Cause Competitive Problems
As written, the Guidelines state that a transaction which in-
creases the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") by 100 points to
a level over 1800 is likely to create or enhance market power or
facilitate its exercise. 6 Although the Guidelines recognize that
this presumption may be overcome by other factors, it is impor-
tant to understand that the critical Herfindahl statistics generally
are based on historical U.S. case law and have not been updated. 7
Given the recent decisions by the courts, the Guidelines' presump-
tion is of no real value." In reality, an investigation of a merger
raising the Herfindahl 100 points to 1800 is likely to quickly
close. 9 Overall, Herfindahl statistics are primarily useful in de-
fining safe harbors in which no enforcement is necessary.
2.2. Accepting Simplistic Structural Analysis of Collusion
The analysis of collusion under the Guidelines follows tradi-
tional oligopoly theory. The Guidelines suggest that the likeli-
hood of collusion depends on (1) the capability of a group of
firms to reach an agreement on terms of coordination that are
profitable to their members and (2) the ability of a group of firms
both to detect deviations from such an agreement and to punish
16The HHI is calculated by taking the squares of the firms' market shares.
17 For more details on the case law, see Donald I. Baker & William Blumen-
thal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexistiniz Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311 (1983). The
basic theory implies that the higher the Herfindahl index and the fewer the
number of firms that compete in the market, the more likely collusive conduct is
to occur. This concept is based on a very simple oligopoly theory in which the
number of competitors affects the performance of the market.
18 See Malcolm B. Coate, Economics, the Guidelines and the Evolution of
Merger Policy, 37 ANTITRUST BULL 997, 1023 (1992) ("[E]fficiencies and other
structural factors can defeat a presumption to challenge a merger when Herfin-
dahls are well over 1,800.1).
19 See Malcolm B. Coate, Merger Enforcement in the Reagan/Bush FTC, in
THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 135 (Malcolm B. Coate & An-
drew N. Kleit eds., 1996).
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any firm found to violate the agreement.2' Historically, analysts
have evaluated long laundry lists of structural and behavioral fac-
tors linked to these questions, while the conclusion on the likely
competitive effect of a merger was significantly influenced by
concentration. 21 Although the Guidelines highlight a few factors,
such as information, pricing patterns, heterogeneity, and market
characteristics, as particularly important, the analysis of the ease
of collusion does not explain how the collusive outcome
evolves.' For an oligopoly concern to be valid, the merger must
change an aspect of market structure that facilitates a price in-
crease.
2.3. Dismissing Efficiencies as Speculative
The Guidelines explicitly recognize an efficiency defense for
an otherwise anti-competitive merger, but also suggest that rele-
vant efficiencies must be both demonstrated by the available evi-
dence and be specific to the transaction under review.' Many
analysts have advocated a high evidentiary standard that has
proved almost impossible to meet. In particular, efficiency evi-
dence was required to be clear and convincing, and alternative
mechanisms were not allowed to achieve the cost savings. Such a
policy would significantly downgrade, or even effectively repeal,
the efficiency defense. 24  Without justification for a strong effi-
20 For a discussion of theories of oligopoly, see Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oli-
gopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 330 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
21 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 23-31, 47-71 (1976); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 116-33, 164-97 (1978).
' See David T. Scheffman, Ten Years of Merger Guidelines: A Retrospective,
Critique, and Prediction, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 173(1993).
1 Examples of efficiencies that could be demonstrated by the available evi-
dence include economies of scale from more efficientproduction runs, transpor-
tation cost savings from changes in location of production, and economies of
scope from better integration of manufacturing assets. Examples of merger-
specific efficiencies include scale economies that represent the best way of loading
a plant, transportation cost savings due to a specific reallocation of production
sced an economies of scope that exploit particular types of reorganizations
only available to the merger partners.
24 For a discussion of the various suggestions, see Donald G. McFetridge,
The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST
PROCESS 89 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996) (examining the
current requirements for mounting a successful efficiencies defense in an other-
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ciency standard of proof, efficiencies should be judged by the
same probability standards that are applied to competitive effects.
2.4. Focusing on the Responses of Infra-marginal Firms
The Guidelines base their analysis of market definition, com-
petitive effects, and entry on hypothetical responses of various
customers and firms. For example, a product market fails if a suf-
ficient number of customers would switch to substitutes; a cartel
fails if a sufficient number of firms would increase output; and en-
try is likely if new firms could profitably compete in the mar-
ket.2" Of course, merger analysis is not a popularity contest or an
opinion poll. The basic principles of the competitive analysis
mandate that the relevant information be gathered from the mar-
ginal players in the market.26  This may require the merger ana-
lyst to survey all of the relevant decision makers or identify an al-
gorithm to focus the investigation on the marginal players.
2.5. Misapplying the Five Percent Market Definition Price Test
The Guidelines base market definition on an analysis of the
hypothetical responses to a significant and nontransitory price in-
crease on the part of all the firms in the potential market. Al-
though a five percent price increase is suggested as the usual stan-
dard, it would be incorrect to accept this level in all cases. For
example, in numerous situations, market rigidities suggest that
customers will not switch among suppliers, much less products,
in response to the five percent price increase test. To properly
apply the Guidelines analysis, the hypothetical must be developed
to ensure that customers will switch to other products in the
same potential market in response to a price increase. If custom-
ers appear unwilling to switch to a rival's product, then the mag-
wise anti-competitive merger in the United States). The 1997 revision of the
Guidelines have relaxed the standard to some degree.
" For an analysis that focuses on the ability of marginal customers to defeat
a price increase, see Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Defini-
tion: How Much Substitution is Necessary, in 12 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS
207 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1989).
26 Firms or customers are considered marginal if they are likely to change a
market decision in response to a small change in competitive conditions. For ex-
ample, a customer indifferent between two products is considered marginal be-
cause the consumption choice is likely to change with a small change in relative
price.
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nitude of the price increase or the structure of the question will
have to be changed to obtain meaningful results.
2.6. Basing a Unilateral Theory Only on Market Share
The Guidelines suggest that a transaction may allow a firm to
unilaterally raise the price of one or both of its products above
the pre-merger level. ' If the products are differentiated, the
Guidelines highlight a competitive concern if the post-merger
share of the acquiring firm exceeds 35 percent. Empirical simula-
tion models generally predict a price increase from any horizontal
merger in a differentiated product market, with the concern in-
creasing with market share.28 Overall, the application of unilat-
eral effects theories have created the impression that the Guide-
lines have imposed almost a per se prohibition against mergers
that create relatively large firms. In reality, it is the structure of
competition in the differentiated market that affects the likeli-
hood of an anti-competitive effect. Market share is not necessar-
ily relevant; instead, product positioning is important. A merger
between the only two significant firms that serve a specific niche
potentially causes concern if that niche involves a substantial
amount of commerce.
2.7. Requiring Evidence on Actual Entry
The Guidelines base entry analysis on a hypothetical study of
investment opportunities (after first determining that the entry
would be timely).29 Although the entry section highlights the
importance of scale economies and sunk costs, the approach can
easily evolve into a survey of expected market decisions. Given
27 For an overview of unilateral theories, see Drew Fudenberg & Jean Ti-
role, Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction
and Overview, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 261 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
28 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differ-
entiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 407 (1994). The logit model defines a particular demand structure in
which the various differentiated products are substitutes for at least some con-
sumers. Holding the combined share of the firms constant, a merger between
two firms with a symmetric distribution of market share generates more com-
petitive issues than a merger between a large and small firm.
29 For a more detailed discussion of entry, see Malcolm B. Coate & James A.
Langenfeld, Entry Under the Merger Guidelines 1982-1992, 38 ANTITRUST BULL.
557(1993).
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that the surveyed firms are not actively studying entry, they are
unable to appropriately respond to hypothetical questions con-
cerning the likelihood of their entry." Of course, this response
problem is the specific issue the Guidelines structure was designed
to avoid. Instead of asking for intentions, the Guidelines focus on
relevant information and infer the answer from the entry on the
weight of the evidence.
2.8. Substituting Complaints or Hot Documents for Analysis
The Guidelines define a construct for predicting the competi-
tive effect of a merger. However, it is possible that an analyst will
substitute uncritical acceptance of customer complaints or "hot
documents" for clear evidence of likely anti-competitive effects.3
While documentary evidence is useful in confirming the Guide-
lines' conclusions of a likely anti-competitive effect, it does not
represent an alternative to careful analysis.
2.9. Considering Guidelines Issues Sequentially
The Guidelines are designed to predict whether, considering
the lost sales, a price increase is profitable to other goods outside
the product market; manufacturers from outside the geographic
market; fringe expansion within the market; independent pricing
by direct competitors; and de novo entry or expansion that re-
quires expenditures of sunk costs.32 However, a naive reading of
the Guidelines could result in the sequential application of the
questions, with the analyst only attempting to obtain sufficient
information to pass a narrow screen of questions before moving
on to the next issue. This type of analysis would be incorrect be-
cause the basic Guidelines' question concerning the profitability of
a price increase mandates a simultaneous analysis. In effect, a fi-
nal analysis must be performed to determine if an anti-
'0 For a discussion of economic issues related to entry, see WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUcTuRE (1982); Richard J. Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incum-
bency, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 476 (Richard Schmalen-
see & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
31 A "hot document" is a legal term of art applied to an incriminating inter-
nal document uncovered during an investigation. For example, a letter predict-
ing a post-merger price increase would be considered a hot document.
3 See Robert D. Brogan, Simultaneity and the Merger Guidelines, 21 J.
REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. 423-31 (1992).
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competitive price increase would be profitable given all of the po-
tential competitive responses.
2.10. Naively Balancing Efficiencies and Anti-competitive Effects
The Guidelines are vague regarding exactly how to integrate
efficiencies into merger analysis. Some policy makers have sug-
gested a price test, with evidence required to show that prices will
fall before an otherwise anti-competitive merger should be al-
lowed.33 This requires significant efficiencies to reduce costs such
that the price falls, even though the merger increases the level of
market power. Such an approach minimizes the consideration of
efficiencies and is unlikely to be appropriate. Others suggest a so-
cial welfare standard in which deadweight losses are balanced
against efficiency savings.34 This method would allow almost any
merger. Numerous compromising positions are available that
weigh both price and social welfare considerations.3" Moreover, it
is likely the various efficiency and anti-competitive effects could
also be integrated into a more balanced analysis through the use
of expected values over the long run.
3. THREE CASE STUDIES
Throughout Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Republics,
Latin America, and Asia, countries that have opened previously
closed or state-dominated economies to competition, have simul-
taneously adopted legislative measures designed to advance and
protect a market economy.3 Specifically, governments have re-
vised or adopted competition legislation as a complement to the
" This approach adds another parameter, the pass-through, which must be
estimated to complete the analysis. if the efficiencies are imitated by other firms,
pass-through rates would approach 100 percent.
" See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968).
" Roberts and Salop present a model that considers a weighted average of
the consumer welfare and social welfare standards for different assumptions
about the ease of imitation by other firms. Although the calculations are based
on artificial equilibriums, the results highlight the sensitivity of the required effi-
ciencies to the model's assumptions. See Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Ef
ficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 19 WORLD COMPETITION L. ECON. 5
(1996).
36 See generally Mark R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition
Law: An Empirical Analysis, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 105 (1998) (discussing a
number of hypotheses concerning the recent growth in competition law).
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privatization and deregulation policies that typify pro-market re-
forms.37
3.1. Coke/Pepsi (Venezuela)
ProCompetencia," Venezuela's antitrust agency, recently in-
vestigated a merger complaint filed by Pepsi. The filing of the
formal complaint was an indicator of Pepsi's objections to the
proposed transaction whereby Pepsi's domestic bottler, Cisneros,
switched allegiance to Coca-Cola after a 50 year business relation-
ship with Pepsi.39 ProCompetencia ultimately found the transac-
tion to be an illegal horizontal acquisition of a competitor's assets
and a violation of Article 11 of the Competition Law. Article 11
prohibits mergers that restrict competition or strengthen a domi-
nant position."
Under the terms of the agreement with Cisneros, Coca-Cola
agreed to acquire 50% of the bottling business. The assets in-
volved included eighteen bottling plants, distribution facilities,
" For an overview of these developments, see generally the collection of
papers in JOHN FINGLETON, ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1996) (examining the implementa-
tion of competition policy during the 1990s in Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech and Slovak Republics and considering the effect of economic and
policitical conditions on state involvement in regulating the competitive proc-
ess); PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT DEP'T, WORLD BANK, REGULATORY
POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (CLAUDIO R.
FRISCHTAK ed., 1995); F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994) (analyzing the three-way integration
among international trade policies, the conpetition policies nations and trad-
ing blocs implement to channel producers' behavior in pro-competitive direc-
tions, and the strategies nations and individual enterprises pursue to enhance
their trading advantage in the international marketplace, and tracing the intel-
lectual foundations and subsequent evolution of these three policy domains).
38 ProCompetencia is an abbreviation of "Superintendencia para la Promo-
cion y Proteccion de la Libre Competencia."
39 See Ed McCullough, Pepsi Plans $100 Million Claim Against Bottler that
Defected to Coke, ASSOCIATED PRESS WIRE REP. (Aug. 22, 1996) (detailing re-
ports of Cisneros' Pepsi franchise agreement). The franchise agreement was
scheduled to remain in effect until 2003, yet Cisneros explained that the con-
tract "included a clause that establishes if either of the two parties decides to
withdraw early, he can do it under the condition of paying a penalty. I'm
ready to assume that." Id. It appears that Cisneros agreed to pay liquidated
damages, although the newspaper report does not directly address this point.
See id
4 For a more thorough discussion of the Coca-Cola case, see A.E. Rodri-
guez & Mark D. Williams, Recent Decisions by the Venezuelan and Peruvian
Agencies: Lessons/or the Export ofAntitrus4 43 ANTITRUST BULL 147 (1998).
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and a number of soft drink brands, including the popular brand
"Hit." In partnership with Cisneros, Pepsi had a premerger 82%
share of the carbonated soft drink ("CSD") market, while Coca-
Cola was a distant second with a 10.8% share. Anticipating an
antitrust problem with ProCompetencia, Coca-Cola offered a di-
vestiture. Coca Cola's solution entailed forming and subse-
quently spinning-off an independent firm comprised of 6 for-
merly Coca Cola-owned bottling plants, 21 warehouses and other
distribution assets, 575 vehicles having Pepsi logos, and 8 million
liters of finished Pepsi products. To ensure that Pepsi could
weather the transition without any supply disruptions to its cus-
tomers, the divested firm was required to offer Pepsi a short-term
lease that would enable Pepsi to continue bottling and distribu-
tion operations. The divested assets offered sufficient capacity
and distribution facilities to enable Pepsi to maintain the same
level of production it had prior to the transaction. Coke gave
Pepsi the right of first refusal to acquire the divested assets.
The Coke/Cisneros transaction, combined with the divesti-
ture of the Coca Cola assets, would have actually lowered concen-
tration from pre-merger HHI of 6870 to a postmerger HHI of
4410. Of course, concentration figures excluding the proposed
divestiture (and based on bottling capacity) result in a significant
increase in HHI to 8746 (with an increase of 2465 points). Pro-
Competencia argued that Coca-Cola controlled approximately
93.4% of the bottling facilities in the country. Based entirely on
the latter concentration statistics, ProCompetencia could justifia-
bly question the transaction.4' Such a case assumed, however,
that the appropriate antitrust product market could be shown to
be the production of CSDs at bottling plants and that the divested
assets were not really independent, but rather, remained under
the control of Coca-Cola. More specifically, ProCompetencia's
case formally rested on the following assertions: (1) the merger
could be evaluated with two relevant product markets, regular
CSD and "light" (or "diet") CSD; (2) the analysis required six re-
gional geographic markets; (3) the proposed merger would sub-
stantially increase the already high levels of concentration; (4) de
novo entry and product expansion or repositioning by current
producers was unlikely; (5) the voluntary divestiture of assets
41oNte, however, that ProCompetencia did not advance a CSD bottling
facility market, but rather a regular and diet CSD market.
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would fail to eliminate the anti-competitive effects of the consoli-
dation; and (6) the merger was likely to result in a substantial re-
duction of competition.
We show in this paper that the ProCompetencia analysis
failed to avoid a number of the Pitfalls. Perhaps the most critical
one was focusing the analysis on the infra-marginal firms (Pitfall
4) rather than the marginal firms. However, ProCompetencia
also appears to have required evidence on actual entry (Pitfall 7)
and substituted documents for analysis (Pitfall 8).
Understanding the behavior of the consumer most likely to
switch to a rival product as a result of an increase in the price of
the good is a key element in the antitrust definition of markets.
The consumer that is more sensitive to a price change is said to be
a marginal consumer, whereas one that is traditionally unlikely to
switch is referred to as an infra-marginal, or average consumer.42
To properly evaluate the likelihood that a price increase would be
profitable for the producer, the analyst should understand not
only how likely a marginal consumer is to switch in the face of a
price increase but also the relative proportion of marginal con-
sumers to total consumers. It is precisely the marginal consumer's
ease of switching that makes firms wary of raising prices. Firms
are well aware that with any price increase, they are likely to lose
the most price sensitive customers. Because firms do not know
the number of price sensitive consumers that determine the de-
mand for their product, they effectively price their product to re-
tain the more price sensitive consumers. Put differently, because
of the inherent information asymmetry, marginal consumers set
the price.
Operationally, in order to identify the proportion of marginal
consumers in a market, the merger analyst must survey a large
sample of customers and determine who is price sensitive. For
example, in marketing surveys, someone who is a loyal consumer
42 In determining whether otential substitutes should be in a relevant
product market, the agency needz to determine what percentage of sales would
be lost to a hypothetical price increase as a result of the merger. If enoughmarginal consumers would switch to another product to make the hypotheti-
cal price increase would be unprofitable, that substitute should be included in
the tentative product market. Only when the agency has determined that a
hypothetical monopolist could profitably increase prices over a set of products
because there are no additional substitutes to which consumers would turn, has
the agency reached the correct product market. This requires that there are
few marginal consumers in a correctly defined product market.
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to one brand may not be so if faced with a heretofore unencoun-
tered change in relative prices. As such, a naive approach to these
surveys may yield an underestimate of the number of marginal
consumers. Similarly, marketing surveys tend to gather informa-
tion on average consumers rather than marginal ones. Without
the ability to properly design a survey, one can still fruitfully use
existing data, but one should take into account the data's inherent
biases and other limitations.
In its investigation, ProCompetencia appears to have mistak-
enly relied on the analysis of data from average consumers. The
record shows that the agency placed substantial reliance on the
market survey conducted by the Malaguti Company. This survey
investigates the market preferences of different demographic
groups, but it does not appear to identify any groups or individu-
als at the margin who might switch products in the face of a rela-
tive price change.43
From the references made to the Malaguti survey, it is not
clear if customers were asked whether their beverage consump-
tion patterns would change in response to a price increase in a
manner that would have revealed the proportion of price sensitive
consumers. The proper phrasing of the standard antitrust hypo-
thetical is as follows: Would you switch to another beverage if
regular (or diet) CSD prices increased by a small and significant
nontransitory amount? It is possible that ProCompetencia chose
to dispense with the price test since, under the price controls re-
gime, a carbonated soda price increase would have been un-
likely.4
ProCompetencia concluded that the prices of different bever-
ages did not correlate, apparently based solely on a graphical pres-
entation of beverage price data. The agency did not attempt to
compensate for fluctuations in factors that affect either supply or
demand, nor did it factor in the behavioral consequences of price
controls and the generalized price control regime. Such cost and
demand shifters are an integral part of any multivariate analysis of
"Marginal consumers" include consumers who will significantly decrease
consumption, with out substituting to another product, if there is an increase
i price.
4 While a price increase may not be likely under price controls, that fact
does not rule out asking the hypothetical price increase question. If price con-
trols do prohibit price increases and the industry is such that demand is fully
satisfied at a given price level, it is unclear how a merger could result in anti-
competitive effects.
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price determination of multiple products.45 It would have been
useful to review consumption data for various beverages
throughout the 1990s. Evidence of the shifts linked to changes in
relative price would have suggested broad markets.46
One additional issue merits attention. Formally, market defi-
nition methodology recognizes the potential competitive influ-
ence of supply-side responses by competitors. The methodology
restricts those responses to those that occur within one year. If,
by shifting the use of its production plant or adding to its produc-
tive capacity without the expenditure of substantial sunk costs, a
potential supplier can serve the market within a year, that firm
should be included in the market. This type of supply side flexi-
bility impugns potentially narrow markets such as diet CSD. Put
differently, unless it is possible to demonstrate that regular CSD
producers are unable to supply diet CSD within a year (without
incurring substantial sunk costs), diet CSD can not be considered
a separate market from regular CSD. Although it is self evident
to some, a well conducted, if not necessarily exhaustive analysis
should easily reveal that diet CSD and regular CSD do not re-
quire different manufacturing processes. Rather, the difference is
entirely in the formulation of the CSD. This technical error did
not seem to affect the decision.
Entry issues represented a significant problem. An important
consideration in Coca-Cola's fix-it-first divestiture is the percep-
tion that de novo or greenfield entry into CSD is difficult and un-
likely to discipline anti-competitive effects in that market. After
having been offered this admission by the parties, it is not surpris-
ing that ProCompetencia reached the same conclusion.
" Under the price control regime, relative prices cannot change in re-
sponse to market opportunities. The 32% average excess capacity in the indus-
try suggests that supply is elastic. A more informative model of the competi-
tive interaction between different beverages may show how the relative
quantities of different beverages reacted to cost and demand shifters.
46 Furthermore, ProCompetencia did not attempt to correct its market
definition to take into account distortions in consumer behavior caused by
Venezuela's inflationary environment. Inflation tends to obscure the informa-
tion content of relative prices. For example, faced with the currency's deterio-
rating buying power, consumers typically buy their supplies at the beginning
of the pay period and hoard good. On the supply side, since the prices of
CSD are fixed by the government, any announced inflationary adjustment
would give suppliers the incentive to minimize sales of CSD until prices are
raised.
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But ProCompetencia still appears to have confused the sup-
ply-side analysis. Although an arguable issue, the main "barrier-
to-entry" that raises the costs of entry into CSD is the need to in-
vest in brand-name advertising. However, this may be beside the
point in this case. The relevant question is not what it would
take for a de novo entrant to discipline a price increase in CSD.
Rather, ProCompetencia should have determined the circum-
stances whereby the "closest" likely entrant or repositioner would
have been able to discipline the price increase. The anti-
competitive theory proposed by the agency is that Pepsi would be
forced to become a marginal player or completely exit the CSD
market as a result of the consolidation. Thus, ProCompetencia
should have determined the likelihood that Pepsi could reposition
itself or reenter the market to counter a price increase led by the
Coke/Cisneros combination." Because Pepsi's brand reputation
would not have diminished after the acquisition, the brand name
barrier-to-entry did not affect Pepsi's ability to discipline a CSD
price increase. An alliance with the Polar Group, a well-
established beer manufacturer and distributor, appeared to offer
the necessary bottling assets. Without a barrier to entry, even a
sham Coke divestiture would not matter. The anticompetitive
theory proposed by theory was not applicable.
ProCompetencia also seems to have substituted documents for
analysis. In December 1996, Superintendent Eduardo Garmendia
found that the consolidation of bottling facilities and the acquisi-
tion of carbonated soda brands was a violation of Article 11 of the
Competition Law. ProCompetencia argued that the voluntarily
divested assets were insufficient to guarantee competition in the
market. This conclusion was based on available documents that
seemed to suggest that Coca-Cola's appointed trustees of the di-
vested firm were insufficiently independent of Coca-Cola. In a
Immediately following ProGompetencia's decision, Pepsi announced it
was reentering the CSD market as a partner in a joint venture with the Polar
Group, a large domestic beer manufacturer. Pepsi's departure from CSD mar-
keting appears to have been very temporary. Thus, it seems that one cannot
support a foreclosure theory whereby Pepsi could be excluded from the CSD
market in the long run as a result of the Coca-Cola/Cisneros agreement. This
also suggests that an appropriate analysis of entry would imply that any anti-
competitive CSD price increase could be disciplined (and perhaps that brewer-
ies could be considered uncommitted entrants in a CSD bottling market). Un-
fortunately, although it was aware of the possible Polar/Pepsi collaboration,
ProCompetencia appears to have been unable or unwilling to address these is-
sues.
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market economy, economic actors are presumed independent un-
less business relationships exist to bind them together. Thus, to
claim the divestiture was a sham, it would be necessary to show
how the financial interests of the trustees aligned with those of
Coke. Moreover, the evidence would need to show that Pepsi
could not quickly remove the trustees by purchasing the divested
firm.48 Similarly, as discussed above, ProCompetencia relied on
available marketing and management documents to conclude that
the product market was CSD without discounting the fact that
these documents were widely understood to contain puffery and
other analytically empty statements. Such statements are typi-
cally meant to enhance the value of the company for the benefit
of stockholders and rarely reflect market conditions.
In conclusion, the ProCompetencia decision to block Coke's
arrangement with Pepsi's long-time bottler fell victim to a num-
ber of the Pitfalls. The difficulties may be linked to data prob-
lems and the unqualified application of a technique designed for a
well-functioning market economy to an economy in transition.
Historical evidence of marginal customers and episodes of entry
may not be readily available to serve as a model for a competitive
analysis. However, as a general rule, transactions that appear to
reduce concentration tend to be pro-competitive. Without clear
evidence that the spin-off was a fraud, enforcement action would
have been difficult to justify.
3.2. Anheuser-Busch/Antarctica (Brazil)
The second example involves actions taken by the Brazilian
Administrative Council for Economic Defense ("CADE"), the
Brazilian antitrust enforcement agency, against one of two recent
joint ventures affecting Brazil's beer industry. In one deal, Miller
Brewing Company and Cervejaria Brahma planned a joint ven-
ture to produce Miller Genuine Draft in Brazil.49 The other joint
venture, involving Anheuser-Busch and Antarctica, would have
" Of course, ProCompetencia could have taken a different course of ac-
tion by claiming that the spun-off assets were not viable.
49 Brahma is the largest Brazilian brewer with a market share approximat-
ing 50 percent, while Miller is the third-largest brewer in the worf. See The
Report, Vote, and Supplement of the Reporting Member of CADE Regarding the
Proposed Joint Venture between Anheuser-Busch and Antarctica, ATO De Con-
centracao, NO. 83/96 25 tbl.6 (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.mj.
gov.br/cade/ingjuri.htm > [hereinafter Anheuser-Busch Decision].
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increased the presence of Budweiser and other Anheuser-Busch
brands in Brazil."0 Antarctica is Brazil's second-largest brewer
with 32% of the market5 ' and Anheuser-Busch is the world's larg-
est brewer. The venture contemplated Anheuser-Busch's pur-
chase of 5% of Antarctica, with an option to acquire 30%. Both
American beers had been sold in Brazil before the joint ventures,
but had failed to obtain even 1% of the Brazilian market.5 2
CADE moved to block both deals.
In its initial decision in 1997, CADE determined that the An-
heuser-Busch-Antarctica joint venture would reduce potential
competition. 3 The articulated theory, based on the American an-
titrust concept of potential competition, implies that a firm not
participating in a market may affect competition in an oligopolis-
tic or monopolistic industry. Two variants of the theory exist.5 4
First, the acquisition of a leading firm might reduce competition
by eliminating the acquiring firm's impact on competition. This
variant is known as perceived potential competition, and evidence
is generally required to show that incumbents respond to the
threat of entry posed by the acquiring firm." Second, the acquisi-
tion of a leading firm might reduce the prospect of future entry
into the market. This variant is known as actual potential com-
petition, and evidence of actual entry intentions is required for
the concern to be viable." CADE noted that the Miller and An-
0 Budweiser only had a negligible share of the Brazilian beer market. Seei.
s' See id. at 25 tbl.6.
52 See William H. Page, Antitrust Review of Mergers in Transition Econo-
mies: A Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113
(1998); Correa, supra note 2.
s See Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note 49.
See generally Guidelines, supra note 1, at S-8 (explaining the two variants
of the American theory of potential competition upon which CADE's decision
was based).
" The perceived potential competition theory has limited applicability be-
cause it is very difficult to prove that market incumbents respond to the threat
of one specific entrant. Hot documents, supplemented with effects evidence,
appears to be the only valid approach.
56 See Guidelines, supra note 1, at S-9. The actual potential competition
doctrine, like standard horizontal merger enforcement, is inherently prospec-
tive in nature. To make a case, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the market under
review is not performing competitively; (2) the potential entrant is likely to
enter; (3) few if any other potential entrants are likely to enter; and (4) the ac-
tual entry will have a pro-competitive effect on the market. See id. All of these
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heuser-Busch joint ventures, "far from rendering the market more
competitive, consolidate[d] [their] structures and even crystallized
the shared dominant position between Brahma and Antarctica.""7
The Anheuser-Busch transaction raised particular concerns for
CADE for a number of reasons. Given its economic size, greater
efficiency, position in the world market and, principally, business
expansion strategy of targeting the main emerging economies for
entry, Anheuser-Busch appeared to be a potential entrant.
Choosing to enter via an association with an established Brazilian
leader rather than by solo entry raised the anti-competitive con-
cern. The association between the former potential competitor
and one of the leaders of the Brazilian market represented the ef-
fective elimination of competition between the companies. In ef-
fect, "[t]he association between two companies translates into a
'non-aggression pact' upon including clauses of discrimination of
prices and market segments in which the two companies will be
active."58
CADE's initial decision elicited pointed commentary in the
international press. Business Week asked if Brazil was antitrust or
anti-foreign.59 The Wall Street Journal reported that CADE was
becoming the newest four-letter word in the international busi-
ness community. 0 In December 1997, CADE stated that it
would permit the Anheuser-Busch joint venture to go forward,
subject to the condition that Anheuser-Busch increase its owner-
ship interest in Antarctica from 5% to 30%, and commit to fur-
ther investments in Brazil.61 As restructured, CADE believed the
arrangement would show a greater commitment by Anheuser-
Busch to the Brazilian market. At last report, the joint venture
still appears to be on hold while negotiations between Anheuser-
Busch and CADE continue.
issues can be addressed with standard Guidelines' considerations, and the theory
is explicitly recognized in the 1984 version of the Merger Guidelines.
" Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note 49, at 26; see also Page, supra note
52 (discussing the Anheuser-Busch decision).
5 Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note 49, at 26.
s See Ian Katz & Richard A. Melcher, Is BrazilAntitrust orAnti-Foreigner?,
Bus. WK., July 21, 1997, at 330.
60 See Matt Moffett, Brazilian Panel is Foreign Firms' Nemesis, WALL ST. J.,
July 9, 1997, at A10.
61 See Jonathan Wheatley, Brazil Watchdog Sets Conditions for Brewing
Link-up, FIN. TIMEs (London), Dec. 12, 1997, at 27.
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This potential competition decision also can be used to high-
light some of the Pitfalls. CADE's adoption of the potential
competition doctrine implicitly acknowledges that high concen-
tration causes competitive problems (Pitfall 1), but also seems to
focus on the lack of actual entry (Pitfall 7). Moreover, the lack of
consideration given to efficiencies implies problems both with
dismissing efficiencies (Pitfall 3) and with balancing efficiencies
with anti-competitive effects (Pitfall 10).
The potential competition doctrine, by its very nature, as-
sumes that concentrated markets are linked to competitive prob-
lems. While concentration tends to be a necessary condition for
competitive concern, it is not a sufficient condition. The Brazil-
ian beer market presents an interesting example of the misuse of
concentration statistics. While Brahma had 46.6% of the market
and Antarctica 31.9% in 1995, those shares had declined from
50.3% and 40.8%, respectively, in 1989.62 During that time, the
third leading brewer increased its share from 7.9% to 14.6%,
while the fourth leading brewer increased its share from .2% to
5.4%.63 These changes suggest that there is a substantial competi-
tive threat to the leading firms from existing competitors. While
the share observations could be compatible with dominant firm
pricing, evidence should be presented to preclude the competitive
explanation." Moreover, a competitive analysis would need to
present a clear collusive theory (Pitfall 2) or a comprehensive uni-
lateral effects story (Pitfall 6) to support the inference of a com-
petitive problem.
Second, a potential competition decision must prove that the
acquiring firm is one of only a few likely entrants. 6' This requires
a complex analysis showing how the acquiring firm could enter
the market without establishing the ease of entry for all of the
other potential entrants. As with a horizontal investigation, it
would be inappropriate to focus only on the internal decision-
making process of the potential entrants. Although some review
of the acquiring firm's actual interest in entry is probably neces-
62 See Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note 49, at 14.
63 See id.
64 Moreover, CADE itself noted that the third largest local brewer was
controlled by Coca-Cola and aggressively increasing market share by its distri-
bution and advertising advantages. See Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note
49, at 16.
65 See Guidelines, supra note 1, at S-9.
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sary to meet the burden of proving a violation, the analysis
should go well beyond intentions to show why the acquiring firm
would enter while other firms would not. A standard Guidelines
entry analysis should be able to highlight the special advantages
held by the acquiring firm to support the potential competition
case.
In the Brazilian beer market, there was little reason to think
that Anheuser-Busch had a special advantage over other firms as a
potential entrant. CADE noted that the second, third, and sev-
enth leading world brewers had formed alliances with domestic
brewers.66 Seemingly, the fourth, fifth, and sixth leading brewers
in the world would also be capable of entry. Evidence that An-
heuser-Busch had made a commitment to the large reforming
economies would only be useful in inferring its entry intentions,
but without evidence that it was precluding other entrants, no
violation occurs.6'
The potential competition doctrine generally ignores efficien-
cies.68 Thus, it is not surprising that efficiency considerations
were also lost on CADE. However, efficiencies remain an impor-
tant consideration in any antitrust case, and a complete evaluation
of the likely cost savings and their implications for competition
should be required in any competition policy. It is important to
note that the proposed transactions were not simply foreign ac-
quisitions, but were joint ventures to introduce new or relatively
unknown brands to the Brazilian market. By enjoining the merg-
ers because of the possibility that effective de novo or toehold en-
try would occur in the future trades a very certain immediate effi-
ciency benefit to Brazil's consumers for a chance of a somewhat
greater future benefit. There seems to be a very small likelihood,
and certainly no proof, that the long-term prices of beer would be
harmed by the acquisition, and it is clear that the loss of Bud-
weiser as a significant player in the market would be a loss to
Brazilian consumers. Further analysis could explore the possibil-
ity that the joint venture would improve the efficiency of the
66 See Anheuser-Busch Decision, supra note 49, at 16.
67 It would also be necessary to show the entry affected competition in the
market. Following Guidelines' principles, this would require the entry to affect
the structure of the competitive problem identified in the initial analysis.
68 This is likely to be a historical artifact of the general disdain for efficien-
cies found in U.S. antitrust policy around the evolution of the potential com-
petition doctrine.
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Brazilian brewing industry, an efficiency that would be passed on,
at least in part, to consumers.
Although the potential competition doctrine can be used to
attack potentially anti-competitive mergers, a sound analysis must
closely address the issues of competition and entry. A detailed
model of competition should be advanced to illustrate just how
the market fails to perform in a competitive manner. Next, a
careful entry analysis must be undertaken to ensure that the ac-
quiring firm is one of only a few, or better yet the only, likely en-
trant into the market. Finally, an analysis would need to be per-
formed to show how the entry actually resolves the competitive
problem. While CADE has focused on a concentrated relevant
market and therefore the theory could apply, the evidence gath-
ered falls short of that which is necessary to meet the high burden
of a potential competition case. Even once this burden is met, it
remains necessary to balance the anti-competitive effects with the
relevant efficiencies.
3.3. Staples/Office Depot (United States)
A third example comes from the court record of the Federal
Trade Commission's ("FTC") 1997 challenge of Staples' proposed
acquisition of Office Depot." Both Staples and Office Depot sell
a broad range of office supplies in numerous cities and towns
across the United States. Before the merger, both Staples and Of-
fice Depot operated over 500 stores.7" The key feature of these
stores is their mega-store, minimal service format. A third com-
petitor, OfficeMax, followed the same basic retail strategy. Office
supplies were also available through the traditional high service
retailers, large broad-based general retailers (i.e. Wal-Mart, Best
Buy, and Club stores), and numerous mail order houses. The
FTC's basic concern with the Staples merger was that the transac-
tion would create an office superstore monopoly in fifteen local
markets and a duopoly in twenty-seven other local markets. The
court upheld the government's position, issuing an injunction to
prevent the merger.
Although the Staples transaction threatened to create fifteen
monopolies, Staples offered the FTC a settlement that required
divestiture of the offending stores. Thus, the court decision in-
69 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 D.C. Cir. 1997).
70 See id. at 1069.
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volved an acquisition which reduced the number of office supply
superstores from three to two in various local markets."
The parties presented elaborate price/concentration studies
purporting to show the likely effect of the acquisition. Relying
on thorough empirical work aided by a peculiar rhetorical twist,
the FTC successfully reversed the product market methodology
by first establishing an econometric result and then concluding
that the superstore product market was the only one likely to
support such an econometric finding. Showing a price effect in
Staples stores because of the entry of nearby Office Depots, the
FTC argued that the office supply superstores constituted a rele-
vant product market.7 2
The court found that the merger would eliminate Staples'
most significant competitor, Office Depot, leading to what could
be best described as a unilateral price increase." However, the
court decision did not really address the ability of OfficeMax to
reposition itself as a close competitor. Moreover, if OfficeMax
could reposition itself to compete, some type of collusion theory
would be required. 4 Evidence suggesting that Staples and Of-
ficeMax could coordinate their pricing was missing from the deci-
sion. Overall, the decision could have contained more structural
evidence to support the hypothesis that anti-competitive behavior
was likely.
71 The market definition of the "sale of consumable office supplies through
office supply superstores" is certainly suspect, and the various criticisms are incor-
porated in the Pitfall discussion below. It is important to note that a correct
competitive analysis will highlight problems with narrow market definitions and
will not find a competitive problem when one does not exist, regardless of the ini-
tial market definition. However, if the appropriate market were the sale of office
supplies, the Guidelines would save the analyst time by noting the post-merger
Herfindahl was under 1000, and no further investigation was required. For the
finding on market definition, see id. at 1074.
72 See id. at 1073. The FTC argued that the fall of Staples' prices as a result
of Office Depot entering the market would be consistent with prices rising if
Office Depot were to exit. From this effect, the government argued, it would
be necessary for superstores to be a relevant market because the effect could
only occur if consumers did not defeat a price increase by choosing to purchase
other products.
71 See id. at 1082.
' A collusion theory would be difficult to craft in a broad market. Evidence
would be needed to suggest that the independent retailers could not quickly ex-
pand their marketing o office supplies. It would be difficult to assert that Wal-
Mart, Target, or the various "Box" retailers could not obtain competitive prices on
inputs or handle the distribution efficiently. Unlike a grocery retailing market,
the so-called fringe firms are all large players in other retailing businesses.
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The court decision appeared to fall victim to a number of the
Pitfalls. Of particular interest are: focusing the analysis on the in-
fra-marginal firms (Pitfall 4), requiring evidence on actual entry
(Pitfall 7), considering Guidelines' issues sequentially (Pitfall 9),
and naively balancing efficiencies and anti-competitive effects (Pit-
fall 10).7'
The court's overall discussion concerning customers who
would not switch to other office supply retailers appears to im-
plicitly address a general desire of Staples' customers for "direct-
one-stop-shopping" for office supplies. However, these infra-
marginal customers will have no effect on competition if a suffi-
cient number of other customers are willing to switch on the
margin. Although the court's decision was filled with evidence
suggesting that Staples and Office Depot maintained higher prices
in the absence of superstore competition, little study was given to
the overall level of prices in the marketplace.76 Without evidence
showing that Staples and Office Depot offered the lowest prices
in each market, it is difficult to infer that marginal customers
could not switch to alternative vendors in response to a price in-
crease. Likewise, the underlying concept of "direct-one-stop-
shopping" was underdeveloped. Evidence suggesting that almost
all consumers needed to purchase some items at Staples or Office
Depot (at prices significantly lower than mail-order) and facts
about transaction costs that implied that the consumer could only
efficiently undertake one shopping trip per-period would also
serve to limit the magnitude of the marginal consumer effect.
Without such evidence, the court's conclusions are not convinc-
ing.
The entry analysis concentrated on a finding that the office
superstore niche was characterized by an exit in the mid-1990s.
The court chronicled a tale of failure and exit after the explosion
of entry in the 1980s.' Market saturation was also advanced as a
barrier to entry. A more detailed analysis of the economics of en-
7 See id. at 1082 n.13. The court found that the Commission had showed a
reasonable probability of an anti-competitive effect, even if a broader office supply
retailing by big store market was considered (in which post-merger Herfindahs
ranged trom 1,793 to 5047). This conclusion fais victim to the Pitfa of assuming
that concentration causes competiive problems (Pitfall 1). The agencies rarelychallenge mergers in markets with Herfindahls around 1,800; thus, at least someof these broader markets would not raise competitive concerns.
76 See i n. at 1076-77.
77 See id. at 1086-88.
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try could have overcome the focus on history. For example, evi-
dence suggesting that a large network of stores was necessary for
entry would have augmented the saturation evidence. On the
other hand, in retailing, economies of scope could overcome scale
disadvantages. For example, the court's decision did not highlight
why U.S. Office Products would fail at entry with a limited range
of office supplies.78 If U.S. Office Products could exploit some
synergy with other services that they offer small businesses, their
limited selection might not be a fatal handicap. Moreover, the
historical failure of Best Buy is not as important as the reason
why Best Buy failed to profit from a niche entry into office sup-
plies.79 Overall, entrants fail in markets with no entry barriers all
the time (restaurants are an obvious example), so entry analysis
based on failure is not very insightful. Instead, the court should
have explored the reasons why entry would not be profitable and
hence unlikely to preserve competitive pricing.
The simultaneous evaluation of the Guidelines' considerations
appeared missing from the overall Staples decision. This was par-
ticularly troubling because a number of the competitive issues re-
quired careful analysis. First, given a finding that consumable of-
fice supplies are available through the superstore market, the
competitive ramifications of the merger depend, in part, on the
elasticity of demand that a post-merger Staples/Office Depot
would face. If the demand were relatively elastic, little market
power would exist. Second, the ability to exploit the market
power depends on the underlying structure of the market. No
analysis was really presented for how much competition could be
expected from OfficeMax and if collusion could be expected.
These issues would have some effect on the profitability of a price
increase. Third, even if an anti-competitive effect would occur, it
could be undermined by entry and fringe expansion. If the ad-
verse effect is small, even a fringe entrant could restore competi-
tion. Overall, without some type of adding-up analysis, which
considers all of the possible sources of competition in response to
an anti-competitive price increase, it appears inappropriate to
conclude that Staples could exercise market power.
78 See id. at 1086 (noting U.S. Office Products' acquisition of Mailboxes, Etc.,
a nationwide franchise of 3,300 units).
11 See id at 1088.
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At this point, one could argue that the factual evidence and
statistical analysis of a likely anti-competitive effect presented in
Staples really substituted for the adding-up analysis, along with re-
solving all the Pitfalls in the Guidelines' analysis." In other
words, good effects evidence negates the need for competition
analysis, because the effects evidence addresses the key concern of
likely competitive effects. Since the market definition, concentra-
tion, unilateral effects or collusive theory, and entry discussions
are all constructs designed to indirectly address competitive con-
cerns, they are mooted by a strong competitive effects conclusion.
While this represents an interesting argument, it seems to turn on
the quality of the effects and the Guidelines' evidence. Unless the
actual proof of effects is overwhelming, the standard Guidelines'
approach is still useful. When the implications of the two ap-
proaches to merger analysis differ, it is necessary to check both
techniques for flaws and reach a balanced judgment."1
The final efficiency balancing appeared to apply the naive
price test of consumer welfare." The court declined to accept the
parties' five year efficiency claims of between $4.9 and $6.5 bil-
lion, although the decision suggests that some efficiencies would
be realized. 3 Moreover, the court also rejected the parties' asser-
tion that the pass-through rate would be approximately two-
thirds, it instead accepted the FTC's econometric estimate of 15%
to 17%.84 While no exact numbers were given in the court's deci-
80 See Jonathan B. Baker, Remarks before the American Bar Association's
Antitrust Section, Economics Committee (July 18, 1997) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/stspch.htm); see also Jerry A. Hausman,
Documents Versus Econometrics in Staples (1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). Baker postulates that the FTC's empirical studies played an in-
portant role in the court's decision, while Hausman suggests that the Staples'
econometrics "cancelled out" the FTC work, leaving the judge with the probhnM-
atic price increase documents to support an anti-competitiveeffect. Dr. Baker was
the director of the FTC's Bureau of Economics at the time of the trial; Professor
Hausman served as an expert witness for the defense.
81 The court's attempt to address the structural issues and its careful analysis
given the effects evidence suggest that the court's decision avoided Pitfall 8 (subsi-
tuting complaints or hot documents for analysis).
8" The court clearly avoided Pitfall 3 (dismissing efficiencies as speculative) by
rejecting the "clear and convincing standard. See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1089.
83 See id at 1090 (noting that Staples and Office Depot have a proven track
record of achieving cost savings through efficiencies).
84 Pass-throughis defined as the percentage of the efficiency"passed-through"
to consumers in the form of lower prices. For a discussion of the analysis behind
the pass-through estimate, see ORLEY ASHENFELTER ET AL., IDENTIFYING THE
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sion, it is possible to consider a few scenarios. For example, if $1
billion in efficiencies were accepted, the savings to consumers
would be around $150 million, while $2 billion in efficiencies
would generate about $300 million in consumer savings.8" The
court did not find the (unstated) efficiency savings to be sufficient
to overcome the anti-competitive effect.
A more detailed analysis would have shown how sensitive the
balancing conclusion was to the acceptance of the naive price rule.
First, take the combined sales of the company as $10 billion dol-
lars and assume 50% of the sales were in affected markets; another
50% of the sales could be eliminated because many products did
not fall into the disposable office supply markets (e.g., furniture
and computer equipment). A 5% price increase on the remaining
$2.5 billion would generate a rough estimate of the revenue from
the price increase of $125 million. 6 However, most of this profit
is transferred to the Staples' stockholders instead of being lost to
society. Assuming constant costs and a disposable office supplies
demand elasticity of one, the merger would impose a deadweight
loss of only a few million dollars.87 Thus, under the social welfare
FIRM-SPECIFIC COST PASS-THROUGH RATE (Federal Trade Comm'n Working
Paper No. 217, 1998).
8 The FTC estimated efficiencies of 1.4% of sales, which appears to amount
to $140 million per year or $700 million over a five year period. See Serdar Dalkir
& Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of
Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in THE AN"TRUST REVOLUTION 143 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed 1999). This could be considered a
lower bound on the relevant efficiencies. It is important to note that the pass-
through will be 50% for a firm facing a linear demand curve and constant mar-
ginal costs, regardless of the elasticity of demand. If a merger changes the struc-ture of a markiet from effectively competitive (with a low p ass-through) to one inwhich the firm has unilateral market power, it is probably better to accept the
50% pass-through, defined by linear unlateral demand curve (with constant costs),
than to try and estimate the pass-through with pre-merger data.
86 The share of the combined Staples/Office Depot business subject to an
anti-competitive price increase is an assumption, while the 5% price increase basi-
cally matches the 4.9% from Dalkir & Warren-Boulton. See Dalkir & Warren-
Boulton, supra note 85, at 12.
87 The loss is one-half the revenue gain generated from the marginal 5% of
customers who choose not to purchase from Staples at the higher prices. The cor-
rection of one-half is used to adjust for the fact that only a single marginal dis-
couraged customer suffers the full loss. All other customers suffer lower losses asthey switch to alternatives for less than the frll 5% price increase. This concept is
easily illustrated by drawing a downward sloping demand curve and two flat par-
allel cost curves (separated by the 5% price increase). The deadweight loss is the
triangle defined by the intersection of the demand curve and the two cost curves
and the relevant price increase.
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standard, the annual potential efficiencies of $200 to $400 million
would clearly outweigh the deadweight loss.
The court took a different approach comparing the $30-$60
million in savings passed on to consumers to the total transfer of
$125 million. This application of the price test (a consumer wel-
fare standard) would clearly support the court's injunction.8
However, if a weighted standard were used, a weight exceeding
32.5% for social welfare would suggest that the merger was effi-
cient for the smaller efficiency estimate. 9 Since this weight ap-
proximates the corporate tax rate, even the court's finding on effi-
ciencies could have justified an efficiency defense.9"
In summary, the Staples decision appeared to be trapped by
several of the Pitfalls. One possible explanation for the mistakes
is that the court decided the decision did not need a strong Guide-
lines' foundation and focused the bulk of the decision on evaluat-
ing the actual effects evidence. Although this explanation seems
sufficient for most of the Pitfalls, a better balance of efficiencies
and anti-competitive effects could have been undertaken. In gen-
eral, efficiencies tend to dominate anti-competitive effects for
most balancing rules.
4. CONCLUSION
We have argued that the decisions in three recent high profile
merger cases suffered from various merger-analysis Pitfalls as ex-
plained in the text and our previous work. The cases that were
discussed were deliberately chosen to highlight the analytical ad-
vantages of a succinct approach to merger analysis based on case
law and economic analysis. The Pitfalls approach minimizes the
cost and use of resources devoted to merger analysis, by focusing
on the most controversial and problematic areas likely to arise in
an investigation. Thus, an initial examination of a prospective
case based on the Pitfalls approach may shorten the time and
88 The pass-through is critical here, since the annual postulated efficiencies of
$200 to $400 million exceed the estimated price effect of $125 million.
89 See Roberts & Salop, supra note 34, at 5.
0 Another efficiency analysis could be undertaken to evaluate the long-run
competitive dynamics of the market. In general, pass-through rates increase and
anti-competitive effects decrease over time. Of course, the conclusion of any
analysis depends on the data, and the limitations implicit in the actual Staples deci-
sion precludes any strong conclusions. Even a social welfare analysis would pre-
dict a competitive problem if the actual efficiencies were small enough.
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scope of investigations, minimize the likelihood of enjoining po-
tentially efficiency-enhancing acquisitions, and reduce the cost of
antitrust reviews.
The approach is also simple to present in court and regulatory
proceedings and to understand. Many of the problems noted here
may have been caused by the way the cases were argued rather
than by methodological pecadillos. Obviously, if counsel failed
to present evidence on a key point, the trier-of-fact would have
difficulty with a relevant finding. Alternatively, problems may
have been caused by the presentation of unnecessarily complex
and confusing evidence. If the relevant facts were not made clear,
the regulator or court may have been unable to make the appro-
priate finding. Thus, an obvious point perhaps worth belaboring
is that it is crucial for any party to an antitrust dispute to present
its arguments in a straightforward, clear, and understandable fash-
ion. The Pitfalls analysis is a readily available conceptual ap-
proach well-suited for such a task.
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